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Abstract:  In this article, we analyse EU energy policy from the perspective of the EU’s 
long-term commitments to combat climate change. We focus on the policy integration of 
climate concerns – ‘climate policy integration’ (CPI). We seek to answer the question: what is 
the extent of CPI in energy policy, and what factors can explain this level of CPI? After 
outlining a conceptualisation of CPI that argues for applying a principled priority standard for 
the assessment of the level of integration of climate policy objectives in other policy sectors, 
we apply an analytical framework, with factors derived from general theories of European 
integration and literature on environmental policy integration, to explain the strength of CPI 
in two sub-energy sector case studies – renewable energy policies and internal energy market 
policies. CPI is found to be insufficient in both cases, and two factors are highlighted as 
particularly crucial for furthering CPI: political commitment to CPI, and the strong 
participation of climate advocates in the policy process. The article suggests that the 
expansion of EU competence in energy policy does not necessarily provide a guarantee for 
full and complete CPI. 
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Introduction 
Since the 1990s, the EU has been actively promoting the integration of climate and energy 
policies to tackle environmental and energy security challenges. The political spillover of 
internal market legislation and environmental protection measures has led to the extension of 
Community competencies into the energy policy area (Andersen, 2000; see also Tosun & 
Solorio, and Schmitt & Schulze, in this issue). Developing EU climate and energy policies 
within a common framework aims to address complexity in governing these overlapping 
sectors. While the development of these policy areas has advanced at the EU-level, this paper 
counters assertions that the EU’s climate and energy policy sectors are indeed integrated (see 
Adelle, Pallemaerts, & Chiavari, 2009; Hildingsson, Stripple, & Jordan, 2010; Howes, 2010). 
We argue that an evolving and developing EU-level regulatory governance in climate and, 
particularly, in energy policy has not yet resulted in policy output that is coherent with the 
climate policy objectives of the EU to 2050. Therefore, the research questions under 
investigation here are: to what extent are climate policy objectives integrated into EU energy 
policy? What factors can explain this level of climate policy integration (CPI)? 
The integration of climate objectives into other policy sectors is referred to as CPI, which 
forms the central conceptual base of this paper. There is an intensifying discussion at national, 
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European and international levels on CPI, based on the rich and extensive body of literature 
on environmental policy integration (EPI) (Kulovesi, Morgera, & Muñoz, 2010; Mickwitz, et 
al., 2009). Little research has, however, focused on CPI specifically at the EU-level, although 
the integration of climate objectives into other policy sectors is a stated political aim of the 
European Council (European Council Conclusions, March 2007). Based on EPI literature, we 
conceptualise ideal-type CPI as a situation where “principled priority” is assigned to climate 
policy in both the policy-making process and output (section 2). Drawing on general theories 
of European integration, we next introduce our analytical framework, identifying four key 
factors for explaining the level of CPI (section 3). This analytical framework is applied to the 
study of CPI in two sub-sectors of EU energy policy – renewable energy (RE) and the internal 
energy market policies (section 4). While CPI in the RE case study can be assumed to be 
rather high, we would expect lower levels in internal energy market. This is despite the fact 
that the development of an integrated and competitive energy market is a key condition for 
integrating renewables into the electricity grid, thus promoting climate policy objectives.  
The overall analysis reveals that even in the relatively successful RE case, CPI falls short of 
the ideal and of achieving long-term climate policy objectives. 
1. Conceptualising CPI in the EU 
The concept of regulatory governance is associated with the notion of the “EU as a regulatory 
state” (Majone, 1996), implying extensive delegation of powers to independent regulatory 
bodies and supranational institutions as a consequence of the development of a single market. 
It is a process that aims to promote effective policy outputs and to correct market failures 
(ibid.; Majone, 1999). As a result, regulatory governance has replaced some older forms of 
state intervention and certain redistributive policies characteristic of the welfare state (ibid.). 
The concept of regulatory governance also emerged from the “governance turn” in EU studies 
(Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006), or the shift from “government” to “governance” (Benz & 
Papadopoulos, 2006). The continuing growth of Community legislation, the expansion of EU 
activities, and the increasing adoption of regulatory policies across a broad range of policy 
areas provide reasons for some EU-scholars to claim that the EU will remain an active 
regulator into the future (Pollack, 2000; Majone, 1999; Jachtenfuchs, 2001). The growth of 
supranational legislation and the expanding competencies in the energy sector, both internally 
and externally (including through the Energy Community, for example), can provide 
empirical evidence for the increasing regulatory powers of the EU (Renner, 2009).  
In this context of expanding EU regulatory governance in the energy sector, policy integration 
as a concept goes beyond simply promoting better policy coherence and coordination. 
Whereas policy coherence relates primarily to policy output and outcome, and policy 
coordination focuses on the policy process, policy integration encompasses both these 
perspectives, thus providing a holistic view taking account of the policy output, outcome, and 
the policy process (Briassoulis, 2005b; Metcalfe, 1994; Underdal, 1980).  
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Environmental policy integration (EPI) goes farther, by applying a normative dimension in 
favour of the environment. Placing an adjective before the term “policy integration” implies 
assigning preference or priority to a specific policy sector’s objectives over another 
(Briassoulis, 2005a, p. 23). While some scholars have advocated “principled priority” for 
environmental objectives in other policy sectors (“strong” or ideal EPI; Lafferty and Hovden, 
2003), others have emphasised the importance of simply taking environmental considerations 
into account (“weak” EPI) (Jordan & Lenschow, 2008a; Persson, 2004). 
We here outline an ideal-type concept of CPI in line with the “principled priority” standard 
outlined above. CPI is understood as assigning principled priority to climate policy objectives 
in all stages of the policy process and its output in non-environmental policy sectors (external 
EPI), and as maximising the synergy among environmental objectives where climate policy is 
being integrated with other environmental policies (internal EPI). Recent literature has 
distinguished between “external” EPI in non-environmental policy sectors and “internal” EPI 
among environmental sub-policies to avoid assigning priority to one environmental objective 
over another (Kulovesi, et al., 2010; Oberthür, 2009). Since the focus of this paper is on 
external CPI into the energy sector, the strong/ideal standard of “principled priority” is 
applied. Applying such a standard has several methodological advantages. It can facilitate 
comparison with other research results and enable criticism. The standard is comprehensive in 
two dimensions: it covers the policy process and output, and encompasses the full spectrum 
from strong to weak CPI (see Dupont & Oberthür, 2011; Lafferty & Hovden, 2003). 
The question remains as to how to measure CPI. While the focus of the empirical research in 
this article is generally limited to the policy output, some initial proposals for indicators for an 
assessment of CPI in the policy process include the existence of procedures that ensure: (1) an 
assessment of the impact of the sector policy objectives on climate policy objectives; (2) that 
climate policy stakeholders (from outside the normal decision-making institutions in the EU) 
are consulted, take part, and are heard in the policy process; and (3) that climate policy 
advocates within the EU, such as DG Environment/DG Climate Action and the environment 
committee of the European Parliament, participate (as, e.g. (co-)drafters of the legislation in 
the Commission or as (co-)drafters of the opinion(s) in Parliament) in the determination of 
policy (Dupont & Oberthür, 2011; Jacob & Hertin, 2007; Schout & Jordan, 2008). The second 
and third indicators, especially, can also play an explanatory role in the assessment of the 
level of CPI (see section 3 below).  
In the policy output, ideal CPI will be achieved if policies are fully in line with established 
(and scientifically grounded) climate policy objectives. This means measuring the policy 
output against the EU’s long-term policy goal of achieving 80-95 per cent reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Depending on the nature of the relationship between the 
objectives of the policy in question and climate policy objectives, the output may be more or 
less synergistic/conflictive with climate policy objectives even without any explicit 
consideration of these objectives during the policy process. We may be able to investigate the 
extent of the gap between the status quo and the ideal of CPI, where the policy under 
examination would be fully in line with long-term climate policy objectives (see table 1). On 
this basis, with an aggregate score on the policy output, and the initial analysis of the policy 
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process (where the presence of all three indicators mentioned above leads to a high level of 
CPI, of two to a medium level of CPI, and one to a low level of CPI); we strive to make an 
assessment of the level of CPI applying a five-fold scale ranging from very low over low, 
medium and high to very high/complete, where very low levels of CPI, for example, 
demonstrate little consideration of climate policy objectives in the policy process and in the 
policy output.  
Table 1: Measuring CPI: Scale establishing gap in the policy status quo against the ideal 
of CPI 
No 
CPI 
Very Low Low Medium High Very 
High 
Ideal/full CPI 
0% 1-20% 21-40% 41-60% 61-80% 81-99% 100% 
2. Analytical framework 
In developing our analytical framework for CPI at the EU-level, we looked at research on 
EPI, and derived factors from both this literature, and from general theories of European 
integration. In EPI literature, different analyses have employed different analytical 
frameworks with partial explanatory power, usually due to the research focus. Examples 
include employing an institutional perspective (Jordan & Lenschow, 2008b); a “policy 
learning” perspective (Nilsson & Persson, 2003); a legal perspective (Nollkamper, 2002); or 
policy evaluation (EEA, 2005; Lafferty & Knudsen, 2007). Rather than applying one of these 
narrow analytical perspectives, we instead establish our framework in combination with 
general theories of European integration to ensure that the framework is as encompassing as 
feasible. Such a broader, more encompassing, framework can help us understand the level and 
variance of CPI (both in the process and the output dimensions) in and across policy fields.  
As a result, we identify four core explanatory factors: (1) the level of political commitment to 
climate policy and to CPI; (2) the nature of the functional overlap between climate policy and 
the other policy field in question; (3) the level of engagement of climate policy advocates and 
the level of procedural safeguards for CPI in the policy process; and (4) the institutional and 
policy context (Herodes, Adelle, & Pallemaerts, 2007; Jordan & Lenschow, 2008a, 2010; 
Lafferty & Hovden, 2003; Nilsson & Eckerberg, 2007; Persson, 2004). These core factors 
together provide a differentiated but manageable framework for the exploration and 
explanation of CPI (for more detail, see Dupont & Oberthür, 2011).  
First, political commitment is a core factor for explaining CPI, according to literature on EPI 
and, also, the liberal intergovernmentalist theoretical perspective on European integration that 
focuses on the state; on grand political decisions; on intergovernmental politics; and on 
member state preferences (Moravcsik, 1998; Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009). At the 
EU-level, it remains the member states that provide the political impetus and backing for 
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extending policy, and this is usually demonstrated in conclusions of the European Council 
(and the various formations of the Council of the European Union). Thus, member state 
preferences continue to play a significant role in the direction of EU policy and the level of 
commitment demonstrated to climate issues and to CPI. Political commitment plays a role as 
an explanatory factor, first, in terms of the EU’s overarching commitment to combating 
climate change, and, second, in terms of commitment to promoting CPI. By examining 
statements of the European Council and the Council of the European Union for evidence of 
commitment to climate policy (by, e.g. expressing the wish to lead on climate policy 
internationally, or backing unilateral action within the EU) and to CPI (e.g. by examining the 
frequency of statements on the importance of ensuring integration of policies, and the weight 
given to climate objectives when several policy objectives are in question), we can trace the 
growth and/or level of political commitment. Political commitment is measured on a scale 
from low (no/little evidence of commitment found in statements) to medium (political 
commitment is evident, but not qualified) to high (political commitment is backed up by 
concrete targets and/or by assigning priority to climate objectives). 
Second, the nature of the functional overlap between climate policy and the policy sector 
under investigation relates to neofunctionalist theory emphasising functional “spillover” as a 
driver of European integration (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009; Strøby-Jensen, 2007). While 
functional overlap between the objectives of climate policy and the other policy sector in 
focus (in our case, energy policy) shapes demand for CPI, the type of this functional demand 
(whether direct or indirect; synergetic or conflictual) may help us understand the level of CPI. 
The more direct (i.e. clear) and synergetic (i.e. policy objectives are in harmony) the 
functional overlap, the more likely that higher levels of CPI could be found in the policy 
output. In addition, where functional overlap is direct, it is more likely to be acknowledged in 
the policy discourse, which is an important element in explaining the eventual uptake of CPI 
in the policy process and output. 
Third, the engagement and participation of climate policy advocates in the policy process will 
likely affect the level of CPI. This factor has roots in both institutionalist and neofunctionalist 
theory emphasising the role of multiple actors in the policy process (Haas, 1961; Niemann & 
Schmitter, 2009; Strøby-Jensen, 2007). EPI literature has regularly underlined the importance 
of openness and transparency in the policy process and the involvement of stakeholders 
(EEA, 2005). Ensuring CPI in another policy sector may require the active pursuit of climate 
objectives by stakeholders (both internally and externally to the EU institutions) to keep 
climate change part of the discussion. In both our empirical cases the involvement of policy 
advocates is measured by examining the proportion of environmental NGOs that participated 
in the public consultations launched by the Commission in the policy preparation process of 
the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive and the third liberalisation package on energy. 
Fourth, a neo-institutionalist perspective leads us to pay attention to the institutional and 
policy context for CPI (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Pierson, 1998; Pollack, 2009). In focus here are 
the decision-making procedures and the path dependency that past policy and institutional 
decisions create regarding future policies (Jordan & Lenschow, 2010; Pierson, 1998). In 
general, it can be expected that CPI is more easily achieved in cases of qualified majority 
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voting; and where past policies have been deemed inadequate, this can open a window of 
opportunity for further policy development and potentially higher levels of CPI.  
3. Assessing the level of CPI in the EU’s energy policy 
Our empirical research assesses CPI in two sub-energy policies, namely RE policy and 
internal energy market policy. We focus on the policy output level, with some reference to the 
policy process where possible, but an in-depth analysis of the policy process is beyond the 
scope of this paper. The ideal level of CPI in both cases is that policy output is fully in line 
with the achievement of EU climate policy goals – namely the reduction of GHG emissions 
by 80-95 per cent by 2050 (European Council Conclusions, October 2009, p. 3). The next 
section provides a brief introduction to EU energy policy generally, before moving to the case 
studies. 
3.1. EU energy policy  
Over time, competence in the internal dimension of energy policy has been shifting to the EU-
level, although this competence remains relatively weak (Jordan, Huitema, Rayner, & van 
Asselt, 2010). While the Lisbon Treaty did introduce a new energy chapter into the treaty 
system, the Commission has long been active in promoting further coordination at EU level in 
energy policy. Arguably, regulatory spillover in energy policy, as a result of the expansion of 
environmental legislation (and especially climate legislation) and the development of the 
internal market, can be said to have aided the Commission in promoting more EU-level 
cooperation in energy policy. Article 194 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU lists 
four areas where policy developments take place at the EU-level: 
• the functioning of the energy market;  
• the promotion of the security of energy supply;  
• the promotion of energy efficiency and energy saving, and the development of 
renewable forms of energy; and, 
• the promotion of new network interconnections.  
This spillover was particularly clear with the adoption in 2009 of the climate and energy 
package and of the third internal energy market liberalisation package. As “energy related 
emissions account for almost 80 per cent of the EU’s total greenhouse gas emissions” 
(European Commission, 2010, p. 2), action in the energy sector is essential to tackle climate 
change. Achieving the EU’s long-term climate policy objectives requires an almost full-
decarbonisation of the energy sector, since any remaining emissions will come from other 
sectors, such as agriculture (European Climate Foundation, 2010; European Commission, 
2011a, p. 5). In addition, energy security challenges, such as the Russian-Ukrainian gas crises 
in 2006 and 2009, and the increasing dependence of the EU on a few external suppliers, have 
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led to calls for greater EU solidarity in energy policy, and a recognition that strengthening the 
internal dimension of EU energy policy could help tackle external challenges.  
The next sections outline the extent of CPI in the 2009 RE directive, and the third 
liberalisation package on the internal energy market. These policies are important for the 
achievement of climate objectives – RE policy directly contributes to a move away from 
fossil fuel generation and therefore results in a reduction of GHG emissions; and the third 
liberalisation package is expected to promote further penetration of RE in the internal market. 
For these reasons, it could be assumed that relatively high levels of CPI can be expected in 
these cases. However, this study assesses CPI from the perspective of achieving long-term (to 
2050) climate policy objectives.  
3.2. EU renewable energy policy 
EU RE policy is governed mainly by the 2009 RE directive (2009/28/EC), adopted as part of 
the climate and energy package, and which outlines the policy framework to achieve a 20 per 
cent share of RE in the EU’s final energy consumption by 2020. This target was first 
suggested by the Commission in its Renewable Energy Roadmap (European Commission, 
2006, p. 3), and later endorsed by the European Council in March 2007. Unlike previous EU 
legislation on RE, the 20 per cent target is legally binding. The rationale for developing policy 
on RE at EU-level includes: reducing GHG emissions; promoting security of energy supply; 
and, promoting diversification of energy supply (Hildingsson, et al., 2010; Howes, 2010). 
Level of CPI: As outlined above, an ideal state of CPI in the policy output requires policy 
output to be fully in line with the achievement of climate objectives to 2050. For RE policy, 
this means that the policy output must achieve a very high proportion of RE in the overall 
share of energy in the EU by 2050. Some scenarios for 2050 advocate an almost 100 per cent 
share of RE in the power sector by 2050 (EREC & Greenpeace, 2010; Heaps, Erickson, 
Kartha, & Kemp-Benedict, 2009; WWF, 2011), while other analyses include a range of 
solutions, including carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies, and nuclear energy in 
their assessments (see European Climate Foundation, 2010; European Commission, 2011b). 
Several issues remain with regard to integrating variable renewable electricity generation into 
the electricity grid, and ensuring the full upgrade of the grid, which renders uncertain the 
possibility for complete penetration of renewables (European Commission, 2011a). 
Nevertheless, with CCS technologies still commercially unviable, and nuclear energy facing a 
renewed degree of opposition in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in March 2011, we 
support arguments for a high proportion of RE in the energy mix by 2050. Taking the top 
ranges outlined in studies on decarbonisation to 2050, even with certain limitations, implies 
between 80 and 100 per cent of RE share by 2050.  
In 2005, the share of RE in final energy consumption in the EU was 8.6 per cent (EEA, 2008, 
p. 44). On a linear trajectory from 2005 to 2050, achieving a 100 per cent share of renewables 
implies an increase by about 10.1 percentage points every five years. Such a trajectory 
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requires approximately a 39 per cent share of RE in the EU-27 by 2020: 19 percentage points 
higher than the current policy goal. However, taking the 80 per cent target as an ideal goal for 
2050, assuming the use of CCS technology; a role for nuclear energy; and some continued 
fossil fuel use in, e.g., heating, implies a linear increase from 2005 by approximately 7.93 
percentage points every five years. This means ensuring a 32.4 per cent share of RE in the EU 
by 2020 on a linear trajectory: 12.4 percentage points more than the current policy goals. 
While the 20 per cent RE target for 2020 is thus considered insufficient (see also Adelle, et 
al., 2009), since it falls short of an ideal trajectory towards the long-term target by between 
12.4 and 19 percentage points, it does set the EU on a pathway towards increasing the share 
of RE. It is clear that a simplistic linear trajectory cannot take into account current high costs 
for increasing the RE share – costs that are expected to decrease over time and therefore 
speed-up the deployment in future decades. However, it is also true that the level of GHG 
emissions must peak long before 2020, implying much investment in RE sources is required 
sooner rather than later (IPCC, 2007). 
When it comes to examining the level of CPI in the policy process, an in-depth analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, evidence shows that procedures for impact 
assessments, consultation and coordination were in place during the elaboration and decision-
making of the 2009 RE directive, and that many of the usual environmental and climate 
advocates were involved in the process. The directive was agreed under the co-decision 
procedure, with DG TREN (DG transport and energy; today, DG Energy) leading the 
proposal preparation. In addition to the usual co-decision procedures, other instances of 
coordination and consultation were evident. The Commission held inter-service and public 
consultations on the renewables roadmap published in 2007, and internal inter-service 
consultations discussing targets took place between April 2005 and November 2006. Public 
consultations took place on the Strategic Energy Review between March and September 
2006, and further consultations dedicated to biofuels took place in early 2006 and 2007. 
Member states, the European Parliament, and the European Council, several citizens, industry 
groups and NGOs took part in the consultation process. In addition, the Commission 
submitted its impact assessment analysis with the directive proposal. In Parliament, the 
Industry, Research and Energy committee was responsible for reporting on the proposal, and 
it consulted several other committees for their opinion. Within the Council of Ministers, both 
the Environment and Energy Councils discussed the proposal for the RE directive on four 
occasions in 2008. Agreement was reached at the highest political level in the European 
Council in December 2008. 
Overall, in the policy output a medium to high level of CPI is evident. The initial assessment 
of the level of CPI in the policy process also leads to indications of the presence of CPI. 
However, CPI in the RE case cannot be considered ideal. Instead a combined score of CPI 
being between 51.3 and 62 per cent in line with the ideal goal for policy output (medium to 
high score), and an initial estimate of between 81 and 99 per cent in line with the ideal goal 
for the policy process (very high score), results in an overall “high” level of CPI in the RE 
policy (see table 1).  
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3.3. Internal energy market 
The third liberalisation package on energy was adopted in June 2009. It represents another 
milestone towards the completion of the internal energy market after the first gas and 
electricity directives in the 1990s and the second package of legislative measures adopted in 
June 2003. The third package provides further “unbundling” requirements to ensure the 
effective separation of production and transmission assets and increased regulatory powers at 
EU level. Under the legislation, there are three models of separation of supply and generation 
from transmission activities allowed: full ownership unbundling (requiring a full separation of 
supply and transmission activities); independent system operator (ISO) (allowing vertically 
integrated companies to retain ownership of their network assets, but requiring the 
transmission network to be managed by an independent system operator); and, independent 
transmission operator (ITO) (allowing vertically integrated companies to keep their ownership 
of the transmission system provided they are managed by an independent transmission 
operator and are subject to a number of safeguard provisions) (Directive 2009/72/EC; 
Directive 2009/73/EC).  
Level of CPI: An ideal state of CPI in the policy output of the third liberalisation package 
would require preference to RE penetrating the grid, and therefore would allow for a non-
discriminatory third party access to the market, provide incentives to invest in new 
infrastructure and to open up national energy markets to competition through effective 
unbundling, regulatory measures and improved transparency.  
As the creation of a common market is a necessary condition for integrating renewables into 
the EU energy market, the third liberalisation package is an essential tool for achieving 
climate policy goals. Firstly, increasing competition in the energy sector challenges the 
dominant positions of energy monopolies on the European market and allows even the 
smallest independent producers of RE to have better access to and benefits from the market. 
Secondly, the effective application of economic instruments for sustainable development, 
including the emissions trading system, depends on the development of a competitive market 
(European Commission, 2007, p. 6). Thirdly, by enhancing consumer rights, the third 
liberalisation package promotes energy efficiency measures and awareness among consumers.  
In terms of evaluating policy output, a sector inquiry, launched in 2005, and a set of country 
reviews conducted by the Commission in 2006 illustrated that the liberalisation measures 
included in the second energy package were insufficient. These measures did not successfully 
remove the conflicts of interests arising from vertical integration. Market distortions persisted 
despite the liberalisation process (European Commission, 2007a; European Commission, 
2007b). These findings strengthened the recognition that ownership unbundling is the most 
efficient way to tackle these deficits, to ensure choice for energy users and to encourage 
investment (European Commission, 2007a, p. 14; European Commission, 2007, p. 7).  
Although the Commission’s original proposal included only full ownership unbundling and 
the ISO model as possible options, the ITO option was also included in the final legislative 
package due to political resistance from several member states led by France and Germany 
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(EurActiv 2008). The ITO option for unbundling is considered an improvement on the current 
situation, but the extent to which it will lead to effective separation and increasing 
competitiveness in the energy sector remains unclear. This option does not require structural 
unbundling, since the majority of the members of the supervisory body appointed by the 
vertically integrated undertaking are not subject to strict independence rules (Cabau 2010, p. 
99). It is therefore questionable whether it can remove discrimination and ensure 
independence of transmission and distribution networks from supply interests.  
Improving regulation to ensure effectiveness is another essential tool for increasing 
competition in the energy market, thus optimising the conditions for CPI. The third energy 
package aims to fill existing regulatory gaps by harmonising and strengthening the powers, 
duties and independence of national regulators and by improving regulatory cooperation 
through the creation of a new EU-Agency that will monitor the cooperation of national energy 
regulators and transmission system operators (TSOs) and manage the development of cross-
border infrastructure. Supranational regulation in the energy sector is further enhanced by the 
new harmonising rules for cross-border exchanges in electricity and gas, and the 
establishment of a new framework for the cooperation of TSOs at EU-level, namely the 
European Networks of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSOE) and for Gas 
(ENTSOG).  
Generally, CPI in the policy output of the third liberalisation package is insufficient for 
supporting substantially higher levels of RE penetration into the energy market. It is also 
therefore insufficient to achieve the long-term climate objectives of the EU, but some 
progress has been made over time, which has set the EU on a path towards improved RE 
penetration. On a scale of very low, over low, medium, high to very high, CPI in the policy 
output can be considered “medium” (see table 1). 
Regarding the policy process, an initial assessment shows little evidence of CPI in the 
elaboration of the third liberalisation package, yet further in-depth assessment is required. The 
third legislative package was, however, adopted under the co-decision procedure. Procedures 
were therefore in place to ensure consultation opportunities among the EU institutions and 
stakeholders external to the decision-making process. The policy preparation included an 
extensive consultation process, starting with the Green Paper on Energy in 2006 and followed 
by two other targeted stakeholder consultations, in-depth country reviews, the 
(abovementioned) sector inquiry and an impact assessment. The process of inter-service 
consultation in the Commission was marked by close cooperation between DG TREN and 
DG Competition, the active role of DG Competition in co-drafting the legislative proposals, 
and the strong application of competition rules (Eikeland, 2008). In Parliament, each 
legislative act of the third package was reported on by a different rapporteur from the 
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, which made policy coordination within the 
Parliament a complex task. In the Council, the Energy Council led the negotiations, and the 
Environment Council adopted the final text of the package in the second reading. Parliament 
accepted the package, including the third ITO option as a compromise solution, during the 
second reading. The third legislative package on energy was finally agreed in June 2009. 
However, there was a limited number of climate advocates involved. Very few Green MEPs, 
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environmental NGOs and RE producers, who explicitly advocate climate policy concerns, 
took part in the policy process leading to the adoption of the third liberalisation package, and 
it seems that climate considerations did not come to the fore in the negotiations. 
In summary, the new unbundling rules, the promotion of energy efficiency, the transparency 
requirements, the strengthening of the regulatory framework and the provisions for 
harmonisation of energy legislation suggest an improvement in the situation for achieving 
climate objectives through liberalising the energy market, yet rather than resulting in high 
levels of CPI in the policy output, this rather increases the level of CPI from ‘low’ in previous 
policy output to ‘medium’ in the policy output of the third liberalisation package. This is 
relatively far from the ideal state of a fully liberalised and integrated energy market, with a 
legal framework requiring a full separation of supply and generation from transmission 
activities. In terms of policy process, our initial assessment suggests that the level of CPI is 
low, since the deliberations focused primarily on competition and regulation issues, leaving 
less room for climate concerns in the process.  
4. Explaining CPI in the EU’s energy sector 
Political commitment: When it comes to overarching political commitment to combating 
climate change, we assess especially the conclusions of the European Council, following 
intergovernmentalist approaches laying emphasis on the role of member states in the EU. In 
March 2007, the European Council demonstrated commitment to combating climate change 
when it endorsed the 20 per cent targets to 2020 (European Council conclusions, March 
2007). In addition, the EU has regularly voiced its commitment to combating climate change, 
both domestically and on the international stage (see generally conclusions from the European 
and Environment Councils, especially since 2005), and agreed its 2020 target unilaterally. On 
a simple scale of low (no consistent political commitment to climate objectives), medium 
(political statements outlining commitment, but no legislation to back this up) and high levels 
(both political overarching commitment in statements and legislation to meet these 
commitments) of political commitment, the EU therefore demonstrates high levels of 
commitment to combating climate change generally (Oberthür & Dupont, 2011). This aspect 
of commitment is a constant overarching the two cases. 
Secondly, the question is whether there is political commitment to the integration of climate 
policy objectives into the RE and internal energy market policy sectors (i.e. commitment to 
CPI). The European Council clearly outlined that achieving climate policy objectives requires 
integration into energy policies. Acknowledging that “energy production and use are the main 
sources for greenhouse gases”, the European Council called for “an integrated approach to 
climate and energy policy” (European Council conclusions, March 2007, p. 11). However, 
this does not necessarily imply an ideal level of political commitment to CPI as no principled 
priority is assigned to climate objectives. Rather, the Council clearly states that “integration 
should be achieved in a mutually supportive way”, implying equal weight to the three 
objectives of increasing the security of supply; ensuring the competitiveness of energy prices; 
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and, promoting environmental sustainability and combating climate change (ibid.). Therefore, 
there is an evident political commitment to CPI in RE policy, but it is a rather neutral 
commitment, giving no priority to climate objectives in particular. 
In the case of internal energy market policy, the level of political commitment to CPI is low. 
Except for outlining the general objectives of the third legislative package as achieving “a 
more secure, competitive and sustainable supply” (Council, 2008, p. 6; Council, 2008a, p. 17) 
and “promoting sustainability by stimulating energy efficiency and guaranteeing that small 
companies, too, in particular those investing in renewable energy, will have access to the 
energy market” (European Council, 2009, p. 19), no other reference to climate policy 
objectives could be traced. The importance of the third liberalisation package for guaranteeing 
access for RE and improving energy efficiency was highlighted by some MEPs. Therefore, 
some level of political commitment could be observed in Parliament. The debate on the 
liberalisation of the EU energy sector focused on the issue of ownership unbundling as well as 
regulatory aspects of the energy market, but no priority was given to climate policy goals.  
Functional overlap: There is a clear and direct functional overlap between the objectives of 
RE policy and the objectives of climate policy since achieving a higher share of RE sources 
will positively contribute to achieving the goals of climate policy (reducing GHG emissions). 
Therefore, the two policy sectors overlap synergistically and co-benefits are large. This 
synergistic and direct functional overlap was acknowledged in the policy process, and is 
evident in the inclusion of the RE directive in the climate and energy package. Therefore, on a 
scale describing functional overlap from conflictual to neutral to synergistic, the direct links 
between climate and RE show the highly synergistic nature of these policies, thus promoting 
CPI. 
In the case of the third liberalisation package, the mutually reinforcing objectives of internal 
energy market development and climate policy account for a clear (but indirect) functional 
overlap, as increasing the competitiveness of the energy market will improve the integration 
of renewables in the power grid. However, this functional overlap, although observed by the 
Commission in various communications (e.g. “an energy policy for Europe”, among others), 
did not explicitly lead to the connections between the development of a competitive energy 
market and climate policy objectives being considered in the policy process or output.  
Stakeholder involvement and procedures for CPI: While DG TREN led the policy preparation 
process on the RE directive, there was ample room in the policy process for NGOs, 
stakeholders and climate advocates in the Commission, Parliament and Council to voice their 
opinions on the proposal, largely due to the normal consultation and coordination procedures 
under the co-decision procedure. In addition, formal and informal consultations took place 
throughout the process. Further analysis of the proportion of, and actual attention paid to, 
these stakeholders in the policy process is required.  
For the third liberalisation package, both DG TREN and DG Competition played active roles 
in the inter-service coordination and co-drafting of the legislative proposals. Inter-service 
consultations involved DGs Competition, Economic and Financial Affairs, Employment, 
Enterprise, Environment, Information Society and Media, Internal Market, and Health and 
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Consumer Protection, and their opinions were considered for the impact assessment 
(European Commission, 2007d). In terms of stakeholder involvement, a broad range of 
stakeholders was involved in the policy preparation process, although it is noteworthy that 
environmental NGOs were less present in the consultation than private industry actors. 
Institutional and policy contex:. The Commission has long argued for further policy 
developments in energy policy at the EU level, by underlining the necessity for solidarity in 
the face of climate change and energy security challenges. This argumentation was finally 
enshrined in the TFEU (see above), although the practical meaning and implications of the 
solidarity clause are still unclear. In the RE sector, the failure of the EU to reach its previous 
RE targets (which were of a non-binding nature), along with the EU’s leadership ambitions on 
climate change (Oberthür & Roche Kelly, 2008), opened a window of opportunity to move to 
binding targets. In this case, the institutional context helped create an enabling framework for 
RE policy development, and the past policy context of the failure to meet non-binding targets 
led to further RE policy that is favourable to CPI. 
The institutional and policy context played an important role for the third liberalisation 
package. First, the political initiative to develop a coherent EU energy policy, based on a 
common legal framework, was launched in the context of rising oil and gas prices in Europe, 
the increasing dependence of the EU on a few external suppliers and global climate change 
challenges. Second, the development of the internal energy market is a path-dependent 
process that started in the 1990s with the first gas and electricity directives. Thus, the third 
liberalisation package was meant to fill regulatory gaps of the previous two packages. Finally, 
the internal energy market was one of the pilot cases for active application of competition 
policy – an objective that was given priority under the Barroso I Commission mandate 
(Eikeland, 2008, p. 19). Therefore, although the institutional context provided a favourable 
environment for further policy development, this did not necessarily lead to an emphasis on 
achieving climate policy objectives in the policy output. 
Table 2: Summary of analysis 
 Renewable Energy Third liberalisation 
package 
1. Political commitment To combating climate change: High 
To CPI: Neutral To CPI: Low 
2. Functional overlap Direct & synergistic Indirect & synergistic 
3. Climate advocates’ 
participation 
High Low 
4. Institutional and policy 
context 
Favourable Favourable 
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In summary, both cases display insufficient but varying degrees of CPI. The overall target for 
RE policies for 2020 falls short of the ideal linear decarbonisation trajectory outlined above, 
although the level of CPI is still regarded as relatively high. Importantly, the current policy 
trajectory puts the development of RE on a pathway towards decarbonisation. The high, but 
insufficient, level of CPI in the EU’s RE sector is affected by the score of neutral in terms of 
political commitment to CPI; the synergistic nature of the functional overlap between the 
sectors; the involvement of climate advocates in the policy process; and the favourable policy 
and institutional context for CPI in further policy development (see table 2).  
The third liberalisation package is a step in the right direction with regard to reinforcing 
climate objectives, although the level of CPI remains insufficient. The analysis shows that 
CPI in the third legislative package is mostly driven by the clear, but indirect, functional 
overlap between both sectors and by a number of institutional and policy context factors that 
have led to indirect enshrinement of climate policy goals in the energy sector. Conversely, 
both political commitment to and stakeholder involvement supporting climate policy 
objectives remain relatively low.  
The main findings will once again be discussed and assessed in a comparative perspective in 
the concluding section below. 
Concluding remarks 
This article examined the extent of CPI in two sub-sectors of EU energy policy, namely RE 
policy and internal energy market liberalisation policies. To assess the level of CPI in these 
sectors, we outlined a conceptual and explanatory framework. The explanatory factors under 
focus here included political commitment; functional overlap; stakeholder involvement; and 
the institutional and policy context. The empirical research showed that CPI remains 
insufficient for achieving long-term climate policy objectives to 2050, in both RE and internal 
energy market policies. This is despite the shifting regulatory governance context from 
member states guarding their sovereignty over energy issues to one where energy policy has 
gradually (and more explicitly) become an area of EU-level competence (Jordan, Huitema, 
Rayner, & van Asselt, 2010; Birchfield & Duffield, 2011). 
The interplay of the main variables from the analytical framework also shows the benefit of 
deriving factors by employing a strategy of combining theories of European integration. A 
focus on one of these theoretical perspectives may have led to a lack of emphasis on certain 
factors. An application of intergovernmentalist approaches only, for example, may not have 
led to the acknowledgement of the importance of stakeholders; and an application of 
institutionalist perspectives only may have neglected the importance of political commitment 
for CPI, as outlined in our findings above. This conceptual framework would benefit from 
further testing and application, both to the policy output and process, in future research. 
With regard to the explanatory factors, it is clear that the high and medium levels of CPI in 
RE and internal energy market policy, respectively, can be accounted for by the variability in 
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results on the factors outlined above. While political commitment to CPI is considered as high 
in the RE case, it is rather low in the third liberalisation package. Functional overlap in both 
cases is clear, but more indirect in the third liberalisation package case. This can account for 
the lower uptake of functional overlap as a justification for taking climate policy objectives 
into account in the policy-making process. In addition, while procedures for consultation were 
present in both cases, the dominance of competition policy objectives and the limited number 
of climate advocates in the policy process of the third liberalisation package contrasts with the 
generally higher level of climate input in the adoption of the RE directive. Finally, in both 
cases, past policy inadequacies allowed for further policy development and an extension of 
supranational governance in energy issues (and therefore a heightened opportunity for CPI, 
although this was taken up to a greater extent in the elaboration of the latest RE policy, than 
the in the third liberalisation package). 
Although EU energy policy is evolving in line with climate policy development, its external 
dimension, and decisions on choice of energy mix and taxation on energy products remains a 
national competence. Energy policy has long been guarded by member state sovereignty, 
resulting in a challenging coordination task for the EU institutions to ensure a harmonised EU 
energy sector. It is clear that the EU’s climate objectives to reduce GHG emissions by 
between 80 and 95 per cent by 2050 will not be met under current energy policies. Our 
analysis outlines the particular importance of political commitment to CPI; the recognition of 
functional overlap between policy sector objectives; and the strong involvement of climate 
advocates in the policy-making process for the advancement of CPI. While these factors 
remain unaddressed, even the expansion of supranational governance in energy policy will be 
inadequate to ensure the achievement of long-term climate policy objectives.  
Research on CPI in the EU is still in its infancy. CPI can be regarded as a tool for increasing 
overall policy coherence in the EU, and as a perspective for policy development that can help 
diminish complexity in policy-making. Much potential lies in expanding this research domain 
and applying the analytical framework outlined above to the examination of CPI in other 
policy sectors, such as agriculture, trade or development policy. In addition, broader research 
into the impact of CPI on furthering the European integration project would provide an 
interesting avenue for future research and analysis.  
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